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Abstract
A persistent concern in the literature on climate policy is that the emissions abatement, which
is achieved via environmental regulation, has potentially adverse affects on firms’ economic per-
formance. I investigate this issue in the context of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
(EU ETS) and the German manufacturing sector. My investigation uses confidential data from
an administrative firm-level production census. As a measure of the economic performance, I esti-
mate cost efficiencies and their determinants for narrowly defined industries with a stochastic cost
frontier (SCF) analysis. In order to directly compare cost efficiencies across treatment groups, I
use a stochastic meta frontier (SMF) analysis. I provide additional evidence of the causal impact
of the EU ETS on various types of firms‘ costs with a difference-in-differences (DD) framework.
My results indicate that the EU ETS regulation has resulted in a small but significant increase
in costs across the German manufacturing sector. This increase is driven mostly by an increase
in energy and capital costs. I demonstrate that the potential to increase cost efficiency exists for
most industries in the German manufacturing sector. The analysis of the drivers of cost efficiency
confirms that in most industries, exporting firms are more cost efficient than their counterparts.
In contrast, the results show that innovating firms and firms that are regulated by the EU ETS
are less cost efficient than unregulated firms.
Keywords: Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Meta Frontier Analysis, EU ETS, Manufacturing Sector;
JEL Codes: D22, D24, N64, Q52
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1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) has continuously been at the forefront of international climate
policy, and the Paris Agreement has only consolidated the significance of its role. While the
EU addresses climate change with many different approaches and mandates, the 2005 European
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) stands as its single most important instrument
in its climate policy. A priori, theory cannot discern how firms respond to the EU ETS. This
is especially concerning if pollution abatement, which is the primary goal of this regulation,
diminishes firms’ economic performance. The relation between the EU ETS and the economic
performance of firms emerges most clearly through various compliance mechanisms. Namely, a
regulated firm may surrender allowances to legitimate its emissions or sell the surplus on the
market, in any case there are opportunity costs to emissions. A firm can also abate by changing
its input choice (e.g., switching fuels) or adjusting its production process (e.g., investment in
energy efficiency or a reduction of fuel usage). Alternatively, a firm may develop less emission
intensive products or reduce its output. Further, compliance options are heterogeneous among
firms and temporally different; some are viable in the short run, and some only in the long
run.1 Although all the abatement options will either demand an investment, reduce revenues,
or increase costs, the empirical evidence on the EU ETS’ impact on regulated firms is scarce.
Therefore, researchers have argued that “ a better understanding of the relationship between
firms’ behavior and the EU ETS is needed, not just for improving this specific climate policy,
but also other emerging cap-and-trade programs” (Martin et al. (2015)).2 This study is one
response to this need. I use cost efficiency as a measure of economic performance and analyze
its interplay with the EU ETS. This analysis is based on a unique and confidential dataset,
obtained by combining several micro-datasets and modules from AFiD over the period from
2003 to 2014 (T=12).3 For narrowly defined industries in the German manufacturing sector,
1 Several authors have previously recognized fuel-switching as the dominant type of short-term abatement
in the EU ETS, due to relatively low related costs (Christiansen et al., 2005; Kanen, 2006; Bertrand, 2014;
Calligaris et al., 2019).
2As of 2019, governments had implemented 57 carbon pricing initiatives, or had scheduled implementation,
around the globe. This comprises 28 emission trading systems (ETSs) in regional, national and subnational
jurisdictions, and 29 carbon taxes,primarily applied on a national level. Together these carbon pricing initiatives
cover 11 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) or 20 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
(World Bank Group, 2019)).
3AFiD stands for “Amtliche Firmendaten für Deutschland”, which translates to “Official Firm Data for
Germany”. The AFiD data are provided by the German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of
the German Federal States. Official governmental statistics and reports on the activities of the manufacturing
sector are based on these data.
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I first examine to what extent the EU ETS affects firm’s overall costs using a difference-in-
differences (DiD) approach. Within this analysis I investigate whether additional regulatory
costs are reflected in energy, capital or labour costs.4 Because a change in costs is not necessarily
followed by a change in firm’s cost-containment capabilities I then proceed by investigating the
firm-level cost efficiency. First, I estimate industry-specific cost frontiers using a stochastic
cost frontier (SCF) analysis and determine time-varying firm-specific cost efficiencies.5 The
chosen empirical model allows me to explore the various potential drivers of cost efficiency: the
regulation by the EU ETS, activity in trading of emissions allowances, investments into research
and development, and exporting status. Most of the industries in the German manufacturing
sector comprise regulated and unregulated firms that potentially operate under heterogeneous
frontiers in the long run. This allows me to employ a stochastic meta frontier (SMF) analysis
in order to compare cost efficiencies across treatment groups within each industry. 6
My empirical strategy is rooted in two hypotheses. My first hypothesis states that the EU
ETS is not a significant driver of firm-level cost efficiency. The principal change that regulated
firms experience when participating in the EU ETS is a relative increase in their input price
because the regulation places a cost on their GHG emissions that unregulated firms do not
experience. Unlike in the existing EU ETS impact evaluation literature, I account for the di-
rect regulation of firms by the EU ETS in the frontier itself. I adjust the energy input price of
regulated firms by adding the carbon price to their energy price. This way, the regulated firms’
cost containment capabilities, are not by construction lower than their non-regulated coun-
terparts’. My second hypothesis recognizes that for the EU ETS to be dynamically efficient,
it must provide incentives for not only the emissions abatement but also for the innovation
in clean technologies. The development of low-carbon technologies will ensure a cheaper re-
duction in carbon emissions in the future (Martin et al. (2015)). With the fixed technology,
therefore, some abatement options, such as switching fuels, are limited. Furthermore, the EU
4In a future version of this paper the results of this analysis will be included in the paper.
5Throughout this paper, industries in the German manufacturing sector are classified according to the
International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC Rev 4.) of the United Nations.
My narrow definition refers to 2-digit industry codes ranging from 10-33.
6In a future version of this paper my analysis of the interplay between the EU ETS and the cost efficiency
will be extended in various ways. I will estimate a model which does not account for the EU ETS regulation
in the frontier, and quantify the average treatment effect of the EU ETS on the cost efficiencies and metacost
effiiciencies of regulated firms for a subset of 2-digit industries in a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) framework.
Furthermore, I will present different ways of adjusting for the EU ETS regulation in a stochastic frontier
framework and show how the results differ based on the adjustment.
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ETS continuously decreases the cap on emissions to encourage stringent abatement behavior.
To keep reducing emissions, at least a subset of regulated firms will have to innovate, which
is in line with Hicks (1932), Porter (1991), and the widely popular Porter Hypothesis (Porter
and Van der Linde (1995)).7 Hence, for regulated firms in certain industries, their production
isoquants may change in response to higher relative input prices as they experience the tech-
nical change through the induced innovation.8 This dynamic can be described as divergence.
This study divides the firms of the industries in the German manufacturing sector into two
groups of firms: the group of "innovators" that comprises regulated firms, and the group of
"non-innovators" that comprises unregulated firms. The SMF analysis enables the direct com-
parison of cost efficiencies between groups of firms operating under different technologies. The
use of different technologies is embedded in my empirical setup in two different ways. First, in
the absence of any innovation, firms operate in various industries of the German manufacturing
sector that use different technologies to produce different types of products. This difference
requires the estimation of separate frontiers for each industry.9 Second, in the presence of strin-
gent environmental regulation, regulated firms operate in different cost environments than their
unregulated counterparts. These additional costs could potentially force them into changing
their production process (e.g., via innovation) and therefore to start operating under different
technology compared to their unregulated counterparts. To what extent, if at all, this materi-
alizes in reality will depend on a multitude of factors. The most important factor stimulating
innovation is the strength of the price signal in the EU ETS.Note, however that the effect of EU
ETS is not constrained just to regulated firms. Both regulated and unregulated firms operate
in the same market, provided they sell the same types of products. Due to increased prices for
regulated firms, market shares are likely to shift towards the unregulated firms that represents
indirect regulation by the EU ETS through competition. Both regulated and unregulated firms
buy energy inputs, but regulated firms can pass through the higher energy input costs, which in
7The Porter Hypothesis (PH) argues that a stringent environmental regulation does not necessarily harm
firms’ competitiveness, but actually even enhances it through enticing the restructuring of firms’ operations. As
Stadler and Di Maria (2018) point out, the PH inherently contrasts the traditional neoclassical view of firms’
optimal production behavior, and instead argues that "there are ample opportunities for firms to make efficiency
gains under the push of stringent environmental regulations." For an introduction to the PH, and an overview
of the related literature, see Ambec et al. (2013)
8This change can also be described as a "jump" to a new cost frontier, which is in line with Breustedt et al.
(2011).
9In theory, the meta-frontier approach allows me to compare cost efficiencies across different industries by
enveloping all industry-specific frontiers with a common sectoral meta-frontier. In the existing context, these
results do not warrant any important policy implications. Nevertheless, I present these results in the Appendix.
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turn again indirectly affects unregulated firms (see Hintermann (2016)). An additional concern
is knowledge spillovers that occur when regulated firms innovate. Nothing prevents unregulated
firms from adopting this new innovation. For all of the aforementioned reasons, the actual in-
novation effect of the EU ETS and resulting heterogeneity in production technologies across
treatment groups may be limited. In an empirical framework, the potential indirect treatment
of the control group is known as the violation of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption.
In this paper I provide a robustness check that addresses at least some of these concerns. The
literature that evaluates the impact of the EU ETS identifies emissions, economic performance,
competitiveness, and innovation as the main outcomes of interest.10 This literature only briefly
addresses the firms’ performance in terms of productivity. Recent work by Calligaris et al.
(2019) combines the structural estimation of the firms’ production function and techniques for
policy evaluation to estimate the effect of the EU ETS on Italian manufacturing firms. Their
findings show a significantly positive effect of the policy on total factor productivity that ranges
from 12 to 18 percentage points with heterogeneous effects across industries. The manufactur-
ing of basic metals and fabricated metal products is the main driver of this effect. Stadler
and Di Maria (2018) focus on UK manufacturing and investigate the interplay between the
UK Climate Change Levy and firms’ technical efficiency. They estimate stochastic production
frontiers in four large manufacturing industries. Their results confirm that the levy had a sig-
nificantly positive impact on firms’ technical efficiency. Particularly relevant to my work are
the few studies that use the same confidential microdata for the German manufacturing sector
to investigate different measures of productivity. Lutz et al. (2017) estimate industry-specific
stochastic energy demand functions. For the period from 2003 to 2012, they identify determi-
nants of the energy demand function and analyze potential drivers of energy efficiency. They
find that energy use has increased over time across all industries, with a range of 2.7 to 6.2
percent per year. The estimated own-price elasticities of energy demand are estimated to range
from -0.39 to -0.80. Their results show that exporting firms are for the most part more energy
efficient than non-exporting firms. Lutz et al. (2017) also shows that firms that eventually fall
under the EU ETS are less energy efficient in most industries than their unregulated coun-
terparts. Investment into environmental protection and into research and development shows
10For comprehensive overviews of these studies, please see Martin et al. (2015), Ellerman et al. (2016), and
Joltreau and Sommerfeld (2019). Recent interesting papers analyzing these issues are Dechezleprêtre and Sato
(2017) and Dechezleprêtre et al. (2018).
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a positive association with energy efficiency. Löschel et al. (2019) combine the use of a SCF
analysis and a DD approach with parametric conditioning strategies to investigate the relation
between the EU ETS and firm-level technical efficiency in the period from 2003 to 2012. They
find no significant effect of the EU ETS on the technical efficiency of regulated firms. When
they analyze the treatment effects at the 2-digit industry level for four different industries, their
results range from 1.34 to -1.67 percent. Further, they only find statistically significant and
positive results for the paper industry. Lutz (2016) estimates the effects on firm-level total
factor productivity using a structural production function approach for the period from 1999
to 2012. His results indicate a significantly positive impact of the EU ETS on the productivity
during its first phase that ranges from 0.5 to 0.7 percent.
This study departs from the aforementioned literature along several dimensions. Existing
studies on productivity analysis only use the production frontier approach. Kumbhakar et al.
(2015) indicate that although helpful, this approach cannot address some of the key economic
questions and concepts that are still not discussed in this literature, as it focuses solely on the
technological input-output relation. Unlike prior efforts, I use a different measure of economic
performance, the cost efficiency. The cost efficiency, also known as economic efficiency, reflects
the embedded economic behavior of the cost frontier (firms’ cost minimization). This measure
is estimated with a SCF (Farell (1957)). In a cost minimizing framework, input allocation is
optimal if producers allocate inputs such that the input price ratio equals the ratio of their
marginal products. In that case, the actual cost differs from the optimal cost by the technical
efficiency. If, however, the input allocation is suboptimal, the cost is higher due to both tech-
nical and allocative inefficiencies. In the model applied in this study, I will assume that any
cost inefficiencies arise only due to technical inefficiency and that firms are allocatively fully
efficient.11 My contribution encompasses not only the identification of the potential to increase
cost efficiency at the firm and industry level, but also the analysis of previously unaddressed
potential drivers of cost efficiency. The most important driver that I analyze is the partici-
pation in the EU ETS. I find out whether the regulated firms can contain costs better, and I
analyze their cost-efficiency levels in relation to different phases of the EU ETS, investment in
11Using the so-called Primal System Approach one could empirically examine the sources of inefficiency by
decomposing cost efficiency into allocative and technical inefficiency. This could help identify how much of cost
reduction a firm can achieve through improvements in the production technology and how much through an
optimal mix of inputs. I leave this for future work. For more information, see Kumbhakar et al. (2015).
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R&D, and the export status. I also make use of the firm-specific transactions data from the
European Union Transactions Log (EUTL) to elucidate which regulated firms have strategically
accumulated excess allowances and how this active trading relates to their cost efficiency. My
approach is unique because I investigate the firms’ reactions to the EU ETS in both the short
and long run, thereby accounting for the fact that input factors are variable only to a certain
extent and that continuous emissions reductions must be supported with eventual innovation.
Therefore, my empirical strategy enables the testing of the PH in a SCF analysis, which to my
knowledge was previously done only by Stadler and Di Maria (2018). However, I argue that
the testing of the PH inevitably requires the use of the SMF analysis, as innovation likely leads
to a divergence into two different groups of firms operating under different frontiers.
Finally, in the SCF I account for the direct regulation of firms by the EU ETS. I adjust the
energy input price of regulated firms by adding the carbon price to their energy price. This
way, the treated firms are not by construction less cost efficient, as their total costs are higher
due to emission costs related to the EU ETS. As I analyze the regulation by the EU ETS as a
potential driver of cost efficiency, I am the first to measure an effect from the ETS that goes
above and beyond pricing emissions to address the potential SUTVA violation. Furthermore,
as a robustness check, I address the potential violation by carrying out cost frontier estimations
in less electricity-intensive industries in which the problem of an increased price for the energy
input for unregulated firms is less pronounced.12
My results indicate that the potential to increase cost efficiency still exists for most indus-
tries in the German manufacturing sector. The analysis of the cost efficiency drivers confirms
that in most industries, exporting firms are more cost efficient than their counterparts. In
contrast, innovating firms and firms that are regulated by the EU ETS are less cost efficient
than unregulated firms. A subsample DD analysis confirms that the EU ETS decreases the cost
efficiency of regulated firms in at least some 2-digit industries. Due to the statistical disclosure
issues of remotely accessed data and related time constraints, the current version of this study
does not contain robustness checks that address the endogeneity and SUTVA violation issues.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 provides some background to the
policy. In Section 3, I describe the methods used and outline my empirical strategy. In Section
4, I describe the AFiD data and additional data sources used. Section 5 presents the results of
12In a future version of this paper, I provide the results of this robustness check.
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my analysis. In Section 6, I conclude with a discussion.
2 Institutional Background
The EU ETS is the cornerstone of the EU’s climate policy. The instrument was enacted by
Directive 2003/87/EC in 2003 and implemented in 2005 to reduce GHG emmissions. The
regulation’s current target is a reduction of 40 percent to be achieved through a 27 percent
share or more from consumption of renewable energy and through a 27 percent energy savings
over the business-as-usual scenario. Both must be realized by 2030 and are relative to 1990
levels (European Council (2014b)). It operates on the cap-and-trade principle and nowadays
includes 31 countries: the 28 EU member states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.
Regulated firms receive emission permits (EU Allowance Units (EUA)) that are fully tradable
across firms in all participating countries. One EUA represents one metric tonne of CO2
equivalent. At the end of each year, regulated firms must surrender their EUAs according
to their verified emissions. The program currently covers 45 percent of EU’s GHG emissions
and encompasses more than 11,000 heavy energy-using installations. The EU has implemented
the EU ETS in three consecutive compliance periods: Phase 1 (2005-2007) as the pilot phase,
Phase 2 (2008-2012) that corresponds to the commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, and
Phase 3 (2013-2020) that implements the emission targets outlined in the 2020 Climate and
Energy Package. Phase 4 is set to start in 2021 and continue until 2030 (European Parliament
and Council (2009)). My analysis covers two pre-EU ETS years (2003 and 2004), the first two
phases (2005-2012), and the first two years of the third phase (2013 and 2014). The cap of
the EU ETS is currently annually lowered by 1.74 percent, which corresponds to a reduction
in emissions by 21 percent relative to 2005 in 2020. With the onset of Phase 4, the cap will
decrease by 2.2 percent annually (European Council (2014a)). The following figure describes
the evolution of the EUA prices since the inception of the EU ETS. In the manufacturing
sector, the EU regulates all combustion installations for the generation of electric power and
heat with a total thermal rated input above 20 megawatts (MW) as well as energy intensive
production processes. This production includes oil refining; the processing of ferrous metals; the
manufacture of cement; the manufacture of lime; the manufacture of ceramics including bricks
and glass; and the production and processes of pulp and paper.The EU ETS only regulates
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Figure 1: The evolution of the daily EUA prices for the period 2005-2014. Source: Thomson
and Reuters, own depiction
large installations with capacities in excess of process-specific thresholds, which are determined
by regulation. The inclusion criteria creates variation in the treatment status, which is why
both regulated and unregulated firms exist within the same industry.13 I report on the number
of regulated and unregulated firms in my dataset across the sample years in Table 1.
3 Methodology
In large part, one can estimate the efficiency scores at the firm level by using two well-known
frontier techniques, the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) or the data envelopment analysis
(DEA). The DEA is a non-parametric approach that was introduced by Charnes et al. (1978).
Contrary to the SFA, this approach suffers from the inability to separate variations in efficiency
from random noise. The latter is not directly attributable to the producer or the underlying
technology. These shocks may be attributable to weather changes, economic adversities, or
plain luck (Newhouse et al. (1994)). Wadud and White (2000) find that in most empirical
studies the selection of the method used to measure efficiency is arbitrary and mainly based on
the objective of the study, the data, and the personal preference of the researcher.
13For more details on the inclusion criteria of the EU ETS, please see European Parliament and Council
(2003).
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Table 1: The number of participating firms in the EU ETS across years
2005 2010 2014
ISIC Rev.4 Industry Total Unregulated Regulated Total Unregulated Regulated Total Unregulated Regulated
10 Food products 4877 4836 41 4878 4832 46 4988 4940 48
11 Beverages 619 610 9 519 507 12 492 478 14
12 Tobacco products 25 - - 21 - - 22 - -
13 Textiles 845 838 7 697 691 6 678 672 6
14 Wearing apparel 514 514 - 313 313 - 270 270 -
15 Leather and related products 188 188 - 137 137 - 122 122 -
16 Wood and products of wood and cork 1395 1380 15 1161 1139 22 1151 1127 24
17 Paper and paper products 858 772 86 825 723 102 794 687 107
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 1682 - - 1490 1487 3 1316 1311 5
19 Coke and refined petroleum products 51 36 15 45 29 16 50 33 17
20 Chemicals and chemical products 1204 1134 70 1218 1138 80 1286 1201 85
21 Pharmaceutical products 285 278 7 255 249 6 275 268 7
22 Rubber and plastic products 2799 2788 11 2749 2734 15 2871 2857 14
23 Other nonmetallic mineral products 1909 1743 166 1646 1469 177 1668 1490 178
24 Basic metals 941 882 59 924 857 67 938 865 73
25 Fabricated metal products 6358 6354 4 6750 6744 6 7287 7284 3
26 Computer, electronic and optical products 1772 1767 5 1632 1628 4 1764 1761 3
27 Electrical equipment 2063 2056 7 1906 1899 7 2011 2004 7
28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 6177 6167 10 5298 5283 15 5530 5516 14
29 Motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers 1190 1180 10 1093 1085 8 1063 1054 9
30 Other transport equipment 350 341 9 256 249 7 281 273 8
31 Furniture 1095 1095 - 981 981 - 1000 1000 -
32 Other manufacturing 1624 1620 4 1458 - - 1521 - -
33 Repair and installation of mach. and equip. 308 308 - 1494 1488 6 1647 1641 6
Total 39129 36887 535 37746 35662 605 39025 36854 628
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, [survey years 2003-2014], own calculations.
Due to statistical disclosure and reidentification concerns, some information is missing.
3.1 Stochastic Cost Frontier Analysis
The SCF analysis originates from the seminal work by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and
van Den Broeck (1977) who introduced an econometric approach to frontier analysis with a
composed error structure. One of the error components represents the noise that one can
predominantly consider as a two-sided normally distributed variable, and the other represents
cost (in)efficiency (CE). Thus, departures from the best-practice frontier, as estimated by the
SCF analysis, may be either stochastic (random shocks) or deterministic (inefficiency). Unlike
the production frontier, which is used to estimate technical efficiency, the SCF identifies the
minimum costs at a given output level, input prices, and existing production technology. The
deterministic part of the distance to the SCF can be further decomposed into the allocative
efficiency (AE) and technical efficiency (TE). Thus, technically efficient firms are not necessarily
cost efficient. I use the SCF analysis to estimate a frontier for German manufacturing firms at
the 2-digit industry level as depicted in Figure 2. To estimate the SCF consistently, I apply the
pooled cross-section model to panel data, which is in line with Battese and Coelli (1993) and
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Battese and Coelli (1995).14 Many other economic studies have used this model on efficiency
with the SCF analysis and MFA methods.15 In my econometric model, I assume that the
functional form of the SCF is Cobb-Douglas.16 Expressed in logs, the SCF can be written as:
lnTCit = α + β1lnYit + β2lnPLit + β3lnPKit + β4lnPEit + τT + vit + uit (1)
where TCit denotes total costs; Yit denotes the gross value of production; and PLit , PKit , and
PEit are input factor prices for labor, capital, and energy, respectively. T represents the time-
trend variable that captures the technological change. α, β, and τ are technology parameters
to be estimated. vit is a normally distributed two-sided random-noise component with variance
σ2v , and uit is a non-negative inefficiency component of the idiosyncratic composed error term
εit = vit + uit. I assume the uit to have a non-negative truncated normal distribution uit ∼
N+(µit, σ
2
ui
).17 Including my variables for cost-efficiency drivers, I can specify the model for
the stochastic cost inefficiency effects uit as:
uit = zitδ + wit, uit ∼ N+(zitδ, σ2u) (2)
where zit = (1, z1it, ...., zLit) represents a vector of factors that directly impact inefficiency. I use
the participation in the EU ETS (ETS) and the interaction between the participation in the EU
ETS and active trading (ACTTRADE) in the above model. I also include different EU ETS
compliance periods (PHASE1, PHASE2) the export status (EXP ), and the R&D (RANDD)
activity. δ denotes a vector of parameters to be estimated, and w are unobservable iid random
variables that are obtained by truncation of the normal distribution with a mean of zero and
14A future version of this paper will also contain results from a "true random- effects" model (TRE) that was
introduced in Greene (2005a) and Greene (2005b). This specification disentangles the time-varying inefficiency
from the firm-specific, time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
15See e.g. Fries and Taci (2005), Chapple et al. (2005), Estache and Rossi (2002), Zhang et al. (2003), Chen
et al. (2014).
16Alternatively, a translog functional form could be assumed. Although a translog cost function is more
flexible, it makes the later decomposition of cost efficiency very difficult due to the so-called "Greene-problem"
(Kumbhakar et al. (2015)). Furthermore, the translog specification includes second-order terms and is poten-
tially prone to multicollinearity (Farsi and Filippini (2008)).
17To correspond to a well-behaved production structure, the cost function must satisfy the following regu-
larity conditions: continuity, symmetry, linear homogeneity in prices, monotonicity in prices and outputs, and
concavity in prices. I satisfy the linear homogeneity restriction (
∑
n βn = 1.) by dividing total costs and all
input prices with PKit . Prior to estimating the cost function with the SCF, various tests were carried out on
the skewness of the OLS residuals, monotonicity and concavity checks as well as the likelihood ratio test for
presence of cost inefficiency.
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an unknown variance, σ2ui . The parameters of the SCF (1) and the model for the cost efficiency
effects (2) are estimated by applying the maximum likelihood estimation method (MLE). The
appropriate likelihood functions and their partial derivatives with respect to the parameters of
the model are outlined in the appendix of Battese and Coelli (1993).18 The following equation
represents the cost efficiency of a firm, as the deterministic part of its distance relative to the
SCF:
CEit =
eXitβ+Vit
TCit
= e−uit (3)
It is estimated using the Battese and Coelli (1988) estimator.
Figure 2: Use of stochastic frontier analysis for industry-specific cost frontier estimations,
Source: Own depiction
3.2 Meta Frontier Analysis
There is often a considerable interest in measuring the performance of firms across different
production groups.19 While the efficiency of a firm‘s performance can be estimated by means
of frontier estimation methods (e.g. SCF), efficiency levels from one firm to another are not
directly comparable if firms‘ operations are based on different technologies (Lin (2011)). The
18To estimate equations 1 and 2 with a single-stage approach, I use the Stata commands provided in Belotti
et al. (2013).
19Nkamleu et al. (2006) compare agricultural productivity in different regions in Africa. Breustedt et al.
(2011) apply the MFA concept to compare efficiencies of organic and conventional dairy farmers under the EU
Milk Quota System. Bhandari and Ray (2012) apply the MFA to the Indian textiles industry and estimate
different group frontiers based on ownership type, state, and organization.
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MFA enables efficiency comparisons across groups of firms without assuming similar technolo-
gies. The concept behind MFAs was introduced in the seminal work by Hayami (1969), Hayami
and Ruttan (1970), and Hayami and Ruttan (1971). It relies on the critical assumption that
producers that operate in various production groups all have potential access to an array of
production technologies. For a multitude of reasons, firms in some groups cannot choose the
best technology from this array, instead they choose a sub-technology. The reasons may in-
clude specific circumstances, such as the regulation, the production environment, production
resources, relative input prices; for each production group, a gap can be estimated that is the
difference between the best technology and the chosen sub-technology. The best technology is
represented by the meta frontier that is common to all production groups and envelops group-
specific frontiers that represent the chosen sub-technologies. Efficiencies in the MFA framework
are estimated relative to the frontier. These are known as meta efficiencies. We can decom-
pose the meta-efficiency for each production group into a distance from the input-output point
to the group-specific frontier (group-specific efficiency) and the distance between the group-
specific frontier and the meta frontier (gap). By construction, meta efficiency is a product of
the group-specific efficiency and the gap.
3.2.1 Stochastic Meta Cost Frontier Analysis
The MFA was originally introduced using a production function approach. Sub-technologies
are represented by production frontiers and enveloped by a meta production frontier. A gap
between these frontiers is known as a production technology gap. In the many empirical appli-
cations since, the meta frontier concept was applied within the cost framework that is based
on the Shephard Duality Theorem ( Uzawa (1962), Shephard (2012)).20 In this case, we re-
fer to the gap between the group frontiers and the meta frontier as a cost gap ratio (CGR)
and in addition to the latter, estimate group-specific CE as well as the meta cost efficiencies
(MCE). Usually, the MFA approach proceeds in two steps. In the first step, group-specific
frontiers are estimated and then using these results, in the second stage the meta frontier is
calculated. Prior methods, by Battese et al. (2004) and O’Donnell et al. (2008), use a de-
terministic meta-frontier programming method, which can be perceived as a mixed approach.
20This was previously done by Chen et al. (2014) and Huang and Fu (2013), Huang et al. (2010), and Huang
et al. (2010).
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The first step involves a conventional stochastic frontier analysis, and in the second step the
use of linear (or quadratic) programming algebraic calculation to solve that the meta frontier
envelops these group-specific stochastic frontiers. Amsler et al. (2017) have recently shown that
such deterministic measurement methods of the meta-frontier distances are not appropriate.
Their findings show that the use of deterministic approaches in which the stochastic nature of
frontiers is neglected may result in smaller expected differences between the meta frontier and
the group-specific frontiers.21 In this study, I use the SMFA for two purposes. First, as depicted
in Figure 3, I use it in order to compare cost efficiencies between different 2-digit industries of
the manufacturing sector to learn which industry is most cost efficient. Second, I use it to test
my hypothesis that the EU ETS in the long-run results in the innovative and non-innovative
firms operating under heterogeneous cost frontiers within a 2-digit industry, by employing the
method that was introduced by Huang et al. (2014), henceforth referred to as the HHL model.22
Contrary to prior efforts, the HHL model uses a conventional maximum likelihood method to
Figure 3: Use of meta-frontier analysis for intra-industry comparisons, Source: Own depiction
estimate the parameters of the stochastic frontier regression in both stages. Hence, the SMFA
ensures that in the second-step statistical inferences can also be performed (in prior methods
this would not be possible without bootstrapping and simulations). Furthermore, the CGRs
21In addition to advocating for the SMFA for measuring various meta components (e.g. CGR, MCE), Amsler
et al. (2017) also show how to make predictions for these components and how to construct confidence intervals
accordingly. In a future version of this paper, the confidence intervals of meta components will be constructed.
22The empirical application of this model was previously, for example, carried out by Chen et al. (2014). In
their study, they analyze and compare the cost efficiencies of Taiwan biotech and pharmaceutical firms.
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can be directly estimated as conventional one-sided error terms, which enables the isolation of
idiosyncratic shocks (using prior methods, the gaps would be contaminated). Finally, the HHL
model further can specify the one-sided error term as a function of environmental variables
beyond the control of the firm, which is in line with Battese and Coelli (1995). Using the HHL
model in this study hence makes sense from a pragmatic perspective, as I can use the results
obtained from the method in the previous section, as my first-stage results, and subsequently
estimate the meta frontier.
First-step: Stochastic Cost Group Frontier Estimation
In the first stage, the cost frontier for each group, the regulated and unregulated firms, is
specified as in (1) and (2). After the maximum likelihood estimation of (1), the group-specific
cost efficiency relative to the SCF is estimated as outlined in equation (3). Finally, for each
group, the linear residuals are predicted.
Second-step : Stochastic Cost Meta Frontier Estimation
I assume that for each narrowly defined industry in the manufacturing sector, the two group-
specific SCFs are enveloped by the meta frontier. The meta frontier is estimated using the
following equation (4) :
ˆlnTCit = α + β1lnYit + β2lnPLit + β3lnPKit + β4lnPEit + τT + v
M
it + u
M
it (4)
where ˆTCit denotes the adjusted total costs; Yit denotes the gross value of production; and PLit ,
PKit and PEit are input factor prices for labor, capital, and energy, respectively. T represents
the time-trend variable, which captures the technological change. α, β, and τ are technology
parameters to be estimated. vMit is a normally distributed two-sided random-noise component
with variance σ2v , and uMit is a non-negative meta inefficiency component of the idiosyncratic
composed error term εMit = vMit + uMit . I assume the uit to have a non-negative truncated
normal distribution uMit ∼ N+(µit, σ2ui). I use the following environmental variables to model
group-specific cost inefficiency effects:
uit = a0 + a1RANDDit + a2EXPit + εit (5)
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The MCE can be estimated in the following way:
MCE∗it =
eXitβ
∗+Vit
ˆTCit
=
eXitβ
∗
eXitβ
× e
Xitβ+Vit
ˆTCit
(6)
I use the following environmental variables to model the meta cost inefficiency effects:
uMit = a0 + a1RANDDit + a2EXPit + a3PATENTSit + ε
M
it (7)
The CGR represents the ratio between the expected total cost relative to the meta cost frontier
and the expected total cost relative to the group-specific cost frontier. That is,
CGRit =
eXitβ
∗
eXitβ
(8)
Therefore,
MCE∗it = CEit × CGRit (9)
3.3 Differences-in-differences Approach
3.3.1 Parametric DD approach with conditioning strategies
In this step of my empirical analysis I identify and quantify the impact of the EU ETS by com-
paring changes in cost efficiency across German manufacturing firms that are affected differently
by the EU ETS. Due to the inclusion criteria of the EU ETS, within narrowly defined industries,
both regulated and unregulated firms exist that enables a quasi-experimental framework.23 The
specification of the difference-in-differences model that I estimate for the full sample in period
2003-2014 is formulated in the following equation 10,
ln(CE)it = β0 + τ1ETSi × Phase1t + τ2ETSi × Phase2t + τ3ETSi × Phase3t
+zitΨ + αi + φt + γs + ηst + εit
(10)
where ETSi indicates if a firm is regulated by the EU ETS. The parameter τ1 on the interaction
terms between ETSi and the indicator (Phase1t) for the period between 2005 and 2007 give
23The identification strategy I use is established in the policy evaluation literature as the potential outcome
framework. For a notable empirical application of this strategy in terms of climate policy evaluation, see Fowlie
et al. (2012).
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the estimated effect of the EU ETS in the first phase. The parameter τ2 on the interaction
terms between ETSi and the indicator (Phase2t) for the period between 2008 and 2012 give
the estimated effect of the EU ETS in the second phase. The parameter τ3 on the interaction
terms between ETSi and the indicator (Phase3t) for the period after 2013 give the estimated
effect of the EU ETS in the third phase. I add control variables Ψ, namely capital stock,
emissions, energy use and output per employee. To account for the observed and unobserved
heterogeneities across regulated and unregulated firms, I additionally control for firm fixed-
effects, αi. The year fixed effects φt control for superior trends in cost efficiency in German
manufacturing. The inclusion of industry fixed effects γs adjusts for all constant unobserved
determinants of cost efficiency across industries. ηst denotes the full interaction terms between
the industry and year fixed effects and nonparametrically absorbs within industry-productivity
trends. The error term εit is assumed to have a mean of zero. When estimating the causal
impact of the EU ETS on cost efficiency for a subset of 2-digit industries, γs and ηst drop out
from the equation (10). I also investigate the average treatment effect of the EU ETS on the
meta cost efficiency for a subset of 2-digit industries. The specification is the same as in the
equation (10), except for the outcome variable being meta cost efficiency in logs, and γs and
ηst dropping out.
3.3.2 Non-parametric DD approach with nearest-neighbor matching
In the literature on cap-and-trade impact evaluation, the use of matching techniques is on
the rise (Fowlie et al. (2012), Gerster et al. (2020), Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016), Löschel
et al. (2019)). Along with the parametric DD model with different conditioning strategies,
I estimate a model based on non-parametric matching to the nearest neighbor, which is in
line with Löschel et al. (2019). This way I do not have to pose any parametric assumptions
on the relation between the cost efficiency and the explanatory variables zit.24 The adequate
control group is identified using the Mahalanobis distance that determines similarity between
firms by a weighted function of observable covariates for each firm. The weight is based on
the inverse of the covariates’ variance-covariance-matrix. This weighting enables me to form a
control group using unregulated firms that resemble the firms in the treatment group and thus
24Remaining needed assumptions are the assumption of conditional unconfoundedness and SUTVA. The
common support assumption is critical to using matching. I assume that the conditional probability to be
treated is larger than zero and smaller than one: 0 < P[ETSi = 1|X] < 1.
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might be affected by unobservable confounding factors in the same way. I match the nearest
neighbor with replacements, that is, unregulated firms can be used multiple times as a match.
I match on the firms’ output, emissions, capital stock, number of employees, and energy use
in 2003. To form an adequate control group, when using the full sample, I match exactly on
2-digit industries, that is, within strata. The average treatment effect is estimated using the
difference-in-differences matching estimator, which is in line with Heckman et al. (1997).
τ̂ =
1
N
∑
j∈I1
{
(CEjt′(1)− CEjt0(0))−
∑
k∈I0
wjk(CEkt′(1)− CEkt0(0))
}
(11)
where I1 denotes the treated group of firms (in the EU ETS), and I0 denotes the group of
control firms (outside of the EU ETS). N represents the number of firms in the treatment
group. The regulated firms are indexed by j, whereas the unregulated firms are indexed by k.
wjk denotes the weight placed on firm k when constructing the counterfactual estimated for the
treated firms.25
4 Data
My analysis relies on the use of the AFiD dataset for the period 2003-2014.26 It contains
information on annual general characteristics and cost structure, and it is particularly detailed
in terms of fuel and electricity use.27 I construct this unique dataset by combining several
microdatasets and modules: the "AFiD Panel Industriebetriebe" (AFiD Panel Manufacturing
Plants), the “AFiD Modul Energieverbrauch” (AFiD Module on Energy Use), "AFiD Modul
Produkte" (AFiD Module on Products), the “Kostenstrukturerhebung” (Cost Structure Survey)
and the “Unternehmensregister” (Company Register). These modules are provided by the
German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the German Federal States and
the information disclosure is mandatory for all surveyed firms and plants.28 I additionally
25In a future version of the paper we will implement nearest-neighbour matching without replacement as an
additional matching techniques. As suggested by Abadie and Spiess (2019), this technique allows for a robust
post-matching inference by clustering the standard erros on matched-pair level .
26I also have data for the period from 1995 to 2002. However, the statistical offices have changed the survey
that gathered the information on energy use in 2003, which hinders the inclusion of data pre-2003.
27AFiD stands for "Amtliche Firmendaten für Deutschland", English: Official Firm Data for Germany.
28Detailed descriptions of the AFiD Panel Manufacturing Plants are provided by Koch and Migalk (2007) and
Wagner (2010). Cost structure survey is explained in depth by Fritsch et al. (2004) and Lutz (2016). Additional
information on Company Register can be found in Koch and Migalk (2007). Petrick et al. (2011) thoroughly
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combine the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) data in order to identify which German
manufacturing firms are regulated by the EU ETS and other external data to calculate CO2
emissions and estimate capital stocks. The datasets are merged at the firm-level via plant
and firm-level identifiers. All monetary variables are deflated to 2010 Euros. For additional
information on the merger, see section C in the Appendix.29
4.1 SCF and SMF variables
My measure of total costs (TC) comes from the CSS.30 My measure of output (Y ) is the gross
value of production of the firm, retrieved from the AFiD Module on Products. The production
data is provided at the 9-digit product code level, which are listed in the List of goods from
production statistics by Statistisches Bundesamt (2019). We deflate the sales values using two-
digit ISIC Rev. 4. deflators.31 Firm-specific price of labor (PL) is calculated as the paid gross
yearly wages from the CSS divided by the annual average of the number of employees reported
monthly in the production census. The firm-specific price of capital (PK) is calculated as the
residual price of capital. The residual capital costs (total costs that are not related to labor
or materials) are divided by the capital stock and are computed with the perpetual inventory
method. The firm-specific price of energy (PE) is calculated as the total energy expenditure
from the CSS divided by its total energy use, and is retrieved from the AFiD-Module Use
of Energy. Energy costs are inflated by the emissions costs for treated firms in the period
from 2005 to 2014. This inflation leads to higher energy prices for regulated firms than for
unregulated firms. Emissions costs are calculated by multiplying annual emissions in tCO2
with the respective EUA price. Annual emissions are calculated using energy use and related
CO2 emission factors. All monetary values are deflated to the 2010 base value.32 Table 2
reports on descriptive statistics of variables across different industries in period 2003-2014. For
the model of cost inefficiency effects, the cost efficiency drivers are obtained in the following way:
Based on the commercial register number and the VAT number, I first match the European
inform on the AFiD Module on Energy Use.
29The AFiD data was previously used in the context of the EU ETS by Gerster et al. (2020), Lutz (2016),
Lutz et al. (2017), Richter and Schiersch (2017),Löschel et al. (2019).
30This measure does not include the material consumption nor the use of external energy and water.
31I use industry-specific price deflators to remove the price component from an overall value measure and
thereby isolate the volume component. The data on price deflators was retrieved from EU KLEMS (2017). The
year 2010 is the base value.
32Consumer Price Indices for Germany are retrieved from the World Bank Group. The base year is 2010.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables
ISIC Rev. 4 Total Costs Output
Price of
Capital
Price of
Labour
Price of
Energy
Capital
Stock Number of Energy use Emissions Number of
(EUR
1000)
(EUR
1000)
(EUR
1000)
(EUR
1000) (EUR/kWh)
(EUR
1000) Employees (Mwh) (tCO2) Firms
10 20161 20839 1,43 20,09 0,14 6391 99 11700 4050 8367(63471) (79875) (4,03) (9,84) (1,02) (23000) (224) (81000) (22314)
13 10262 12405 1,29 26,32 0,11 5249 99 9611 3808 1289(19241) (23556) (2,83) (9,62) (1,04) (10700) (131) (25900) (9388)
16 12715 1194 1,44 26,39 0,19 5362 67 16800 2821 2149(24323) (29417) (4,19) (8,46) (1,65) (17000) (115) (102000) (15882)
19 1036800 677902 2,53 49,96 0,45 150000 388 1640000 468189 74(2982053) (2198909) (4,58) (16,51) (3,37) (309000) (725) (4300000) (1230527)
20 67312 78205 1,96 39,82 0,35 36500 263 218000 67042 1968(361984) (373298) (23,28) (12,96) (14,25) (184000) (1234) (2280000) (609983)
21 109414 104273 1,62 40,69 0,18 57300 452 26400 9325 450(384318) (357973) (3,29) (13,61) (1,60) (258000) (1295) (92000) (27786)
22 22926 19327 1,14 29,36 0,14 7809 129 8548 4456 4218(65626) (55109) (6,28) (9,29) (1,69) (23200) (319) (34500) (14938)
24 50556 86211 1,11 36,15 0,16 24500 268 265000 97588 1388(191335) (365361) (3,40) (10,13) (2,15) (112000) (838) (2790000) (907727)
25 15104 12985 1,49 30,40 0,14 4737 91 4180 1942 10583(31800) (31952) (16,93) (9,59) (1,29) (12600) (166) (25700) (12127)
26 36711 31159 1,68 37,48 0,47 12200 166 4650 2558 3029(149353) (135456) (3,52) (13,69) (19,40) (90800) 497 (35400) (18439)
27 45680 35504 1,60 33,20 0,17 10700 234 5560 2759 3248(534098) (339797) (3,28) (11,55) (1,35) (120000) 2604 (49400) (23655)
28 31269 29633 1,71 37,39 0,20 7912 165 4322 1934 9521(151348) (120373) (12,79) (12,20) (6,20) (54100) (792) (34600) (14188)
29 164582 221849 1,79 33,10 0,50 60600 729 31900 15432 1807(1256032) (2304456) (7,89) (12,02) (11,96) (584000) (5904) (282000) (133666)
30 71503 88776 1,56 35,37 0,19 24100 440 17800 7410 2171(305896) (388130) (3,31) (12,77) (3,29) (142000) (1623) (189000) (84517)
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, [survey years 2003-2014], own calculations.
Standard deviations in the parentheses.
Emissions Transactions Log to the German official Business Register. In the next step, I can
directly match the AFiD to the EUTL in the period from 2005 to 2014. This matching allows
me to generate the dummy variable for the participation in the EU ETS (ETS). I also create a
dummy variable for actively trading firms (ACTTRADE) by using information from EUTL. I
identify the firm as an active trader if its number of trades in a given year exceeds the median
of trades by all firms in that same year. I create dummy variables for the first (PHASE1)
and the second phase (PHASE2) to implicitly control for varying EUA prices. The dummy
variable for R&D activity (RANDD) is created by identifying firms whose R&D expenditure
are positive. For the model of meta cost inefficiency effects, I create a dummy (PATENTS),
that identifies a patent investing firm if investments into patents in a given year are positive.
Table 3 reports on descriptive statistics of cost efficiency drivers across different industries in
period 2003-2014.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of cost efficiency drivers
ISIC Rev. 4 ETS EXP RANDD ACTTRADE PHASE1 PHASE2 PATENTS
10 0.074 0.055 0.127 0.086 0.077 0.071 0.105
13 0.011 0.025 0.016 0.003 0.013 0.011 0.018
16 0.033 0.027 0.033 0.021 0.030 0.034 0.066
19 0.026 0.001 0.001 0.058 0.024 0.023 0.002
20 0.126 0.042 0.030 0.142 0.129 0.123 0.036
21 0.011 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.012
22 0.021 0.079 0.069 0.016 0.020 0.021 0.055
24 0.107 0.028 0.016 0.094 0.109 0.103 0.019
25 0.009 0.152 0.176 0.002 0.009 0.010 0.128
26 0.007 0.061 0.052 0.001 0.010 0.006 0.053
27 0.011 0.059 0.052 0.007 0.011 0.012 0.052
28 0.022 0.185 0.153 0.008 0.021 0.022 0.134
29 0.015 0.033 0.025 0.020 0.018 0.014 0.031
30 0.045 0.048 0.038 0.040 0.017 0.072 0.039
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, [survey years 2003-2014], own calculations.
Standard deviations in the parentheses.
5 Results
In this section I present the estimated stochastic cost frontier as well as the simultaneously esti-
mated relations of different drivers and energy efficiency for 14 2-digit industries. I also present
results of the stochastic meta cost frontier analysis for in terms of intra-industry comparisons.
I conclude with preliminary results of the DD analysis.
5.1 Stochastic Frontier Analysis
Parameter estimates of the stochastic cost frontier model in Table 4 vary across industries,
reflecting heterogeneity. Estimates have plausible signs from an economic point of view. The
positive sign of output and normalized input prices can be interpreted as follows: given the
technology, a respective increase in these variables would increase total costs. Price of energy
accounts for a relatively small share of total costs, whereas the contrary can be observed for
the price of labor. The negative and highly statistically significant time trend hints at the
fact that the total costs decreased over time in all industries except for industries (19), (25),
(28), and (30). This decrease suggests that a change in the technology of production occurred
during the observation period, although the time-trend variable captures also other time-trend
effects. The results range from -0,005 in industry (16) to -0,031 in industry (27), which reflects
a decrease in total costs of 0.5 to 3% per year. Table 5 presents the relation between several
determinants and cost efficiency. I find that participation in the EU ETS is a significant driver
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Table 4: Estimation results for the stochastic cost frontier
ISIC Rev.4 lnY lnPE lnPL T
10 0.647*** 0.162*** 0.708***−0.013***
13 0.708*** 0.099*** 0.858***−0.013***
16 0.726*** 0.047*** 0.885***−0.005**
19 0.809*** 0.026 0.533*** 0.009
20 0.742*** 0.062*** 0.876***−0.021***
21 0.845*** 0.142*** 0.833***−0.006**
22 0.814*** 0.158*** 0.770***−0.020***
24 0.708*** 0.052*** 0.971***−0.013***
25 0.761*** 0.111*** 0.863*** 0.003***
26 0.779*** 0.038*** 0.929***−0.013***
27 0.807*** 0.087*** 0.854***−0.031***
28 0.801*** 0.085*** 0.913*** 0.001
29 0.772*** 0.060*** 0.940***−0.011***
30 0.671*** 0.013 1.000***−0.004
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05,***p<0.01; Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, [survey
years 2003-2014], own calculations.
of cost inefficiency in most industries, which means that regulated firms in these industries are
worse at containing costs than their non-regulated counterparts. EU ETS seems to regulate
less cost efficient firms. Investment into research and development is associated with increased
cost inefficiency in most industries, as well as, active trading with emission permits. I can show
for the first time that there is a positive relationship between exporting and cost efficiency of
manufacturing firms.
Table 5: Estimation results for the cost inefficiency drivers and variance parameters
ISIC Rev.4 ETS RANDD EXP ACTTRADE PHASE1 PHASE2 σu λu = σu/σv
10 0.838*** 0.482*** −0.392*** 0.192* −0.121 −0.080 0.455*** 0.882***
13 0.764 0.238*** −0.738*** 0.349 0.445 0.275 −0.592*** 1.622***
16 0.496*** 0.327*** −0.005 −0.217 0.125 0.156 0.573*** 1.809***
19 1.444*** −1.039*** −2.144*** 0.847** 0.455 0.116 1.353*** 5.050***
20 0.935*** 0.308*** −0.887*** 0.676*** 0.001 0.158 0.795*** 1.955***
21 1.723*** 0.450*** −1.408*** 0.361 −0.790 −0.701 0.946*** 2.700***
22 0.337** 0.338*** −0.189*** 0.196 −0.051 0.124 0.405*** 1.254***
24 0.301*** 0.428*** −0.074 0.316*** 0.078 0.127 0.230*** 0.480***
25 0.917*** 0.512*** −0.330*** 0.240 −0.303 −0.219 0.502*** 1.542***
26 2.319** 0.204*** −0.692*** −0.082 −0.245 0.160 0.776*** 2.148***
27 0.857** 0.246*** −0.447*** 0.622* −0.283 0.164 0.631*** 1.853***
28 1.138*** 0.216*** −1.165*** 0.060 −0.006 0.008 0.706*** 2.244***
29 1.246*** 0.647*** −1.265*** 0.194 0.196 0.104 0.699*** 1.764***
30 1.527*** 0.790*** −1.112*** −0.066 0.218 0.104 1.044*** 3.322***
Notes: *p<0.10, **p<0.05,***p<0.01; Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, [survey
years 2003-2014], own calculations.
There are two indicators for cost efficiency in my model. First, the estimates of λ denote
the relative contribution of the variance in cost efficiency (σu) in proportion to the variance
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of the error (σv). The statistical significance of λ indicates the presence of cost efficiency. I
can identify cost inefficiencies for all of the industries presented. These inefficiencies suggest I
can reject the null hypothesis of λ = 0, as there are differences in cost efficiency between firms
within a specific narrowly defined industry. The second indicator is the cost efficiency score.
These scores are presented in Table 6. The highest possible score is one that indicates there
is no potential for cost efficiency improvements in a specific 2-digit industry. In the Appendix,
Figures 4 and 5 show the the development of mean cost efficiency scores over time and between
treatment groups for selected 2-digit industries.
Table 6: Average yearly cost efficiency for 2-digit industries
ISIC Rev.4 Industry CE sd p10 p50 p75 N
10 Food 0.734 0.095 0.615 0.748 0.802 20720
13 Textiles 0.752 0.110 0.610 0.776 0.830 4630
16 Wood and products of wood and cork 0.652 0.154 0.425 0.682 0.773 4622
19 Coke and refined petroleum products 0.547 0.273 0.128 0.638 0.784 488
20 Chemicals and chemical products 0.663 0.157 0.430 0.704 0.780 9396
21 Pharmaceutical products 0.675 0.157 0.452 0.711 0.777 2129
22 Rubber and plastic products 0.750 0.104 0.612 0.771 0.826 10247
24 Basic metals 0.792 0.111 0.641 0.843 0.868 7154
25 Fabricated metal products 0.724 0.121 0.570 0.747 0.810 21673
26 Computer, electronic and optical products 0.669 0.152 0.468 0.701 0.779 8351
27 Electrical equipment 0.691 0.136 0.516 0.716 0.789 10653
28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.748 0.122 0.591 0.776 0.832 26574
29 Motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers 0.730 0.126 0.575 0.760 0.817 7432
30 Other transport equipment 0.593 0.194 0.316 0.632 0.742 2622
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, [survey years 2003-
2014], own calculations.
5.2 Stochastic Meta Frontier Analysis
The results in Table 6 give some indication about cost saving potential of firms in a specific
industry. In order to make meaningful comparisons of cost efficiency between different industries
(inter-industry comparison), and different treatment groups within an industry (intra-industry
comparison), SMF analysis is required. As mentioned above, the results of inter-industry
comparisons are shown in the Appendix in Tables A.1
5.2.1 Intra-industry Comparison
The use of SMF analysis is also required if one wants to directly compare cost efficiency of firms
operating in different groups, under heterogeneous stochastic cost frontiers, using different tech-
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nologies. My second hypothesis stating that innovation, encouraged by the EU ETS regulation,
in some industries potentially causes a divergence of regulated and non-regulated firms, has thus
far been proven for industries (19) and (21). The Likelihood Ratio Test confirmed, that the use
Table 7: The comparison of mean cost efficiency scores between differently treated groups across
years
Year CE CGR MCE CE CGR MCE
ISIC Rev. 4 (19) treatment group control group
2003 0,8262 0,6259 0,5309 0,7023 0,8415 0,5915
(0,1816) (0,1767) (0,2168) (0,2264) (0,0515) (0,1915)
2005 0,8015 0,6382 0,5292 0,6878 0,8268 0,5714
(0,2162) (0,1753) (0,2365) (0,2107) (0,0670) (0,1825)
2010 0,7732 0,6972 0,5573 0,6865 0,8011 0,5662
(0,2416) (0,1500) (0,2444) (0,2357) (0,1069) (0,2103)
ISIC Rev. 4 (21) treatment group control group
2003 0,5709 0,5917 0,3378 0,6714 0,9773 0,6563
(0,1265) (0,1577) (0,1124) (0,1673) (0,0024) (0,1638)
2005 0,6228 0,6719 0,4190 0,6832 0,9776 0,6680
(0,1544) (0,1794) (0,1536) (0,1536) (0,0024) (0,1503)
2010 0,6431 0,6638 0,4259 0,6899 0,9786 0,6752
(0,1429) (0,2128) (0,1553) (0,1365) (0,0018) (0,1336)
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, [survey years 2003-2014], own
calculations. Standard deviations in parentheses.
of heterogeneous frontiers for the treated and non-treated group is superior to using a homo-
geneous/pooled stochastic cost frontier. Table 7 shows that in the case of industry (19), when
directly comparing cost efficiencies (CE), estimated using separate stochastic cost frontiers for
treated and control groups of firms, treated firms are more cost-efficient than control firms in
years 2003, 2005 and 2010. The latter direct comparison is not valid, as it requires the SMF ap-
proach. When comparing the meta cost efficiency scores (MCE), the treatment group actually
consistently demonstrates lower cost efficiency compared to the control group. Admittedly, the
difference decreases over time. For industry (21), the application of SMF analysis exposes big
differences between the cost efficiency of treatment and control group of firms. While the direct
comparison of CE scores would indicate a difference of roughly 10%, the comparison of MCE
scores indicates a difference of more than 30% in year 2003. This difference in MCE decreases
over time. Figure 7 in the Appendix depicts intra-industry comparison of yearly mean meta
cost efficiency scores across treatment groups for 2-digit industries (19) and (21).
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5.3 Difference-in-differences Analysis
Table 8 reports the results of the parametric DD model described in Section 3.3.1 for the full
sample (industries (10)-(33). The outcome variable is the cost efficiency, measured against a
pooled stochastic cost frontier in logs. Table 8 shows the estimates of specification that includes
control variables, fixed effects and full interaction terms on industry and year.
5.3.1 Cost efficiency measured against a stochastic cost frontier
Table 8: Parametric DD approach treatment effects of a full sample
Dependent Variable:
Cost efficiency in logs
Full sample
Phase1 -0.153*
Phase2 -0.161*
Phase3 -0.157*
Year FE yes
Firm FE yes
Industry FE yes
Industry × Year FE yes
Additional Controls yes
# Observations 175359
Standard errors are computed by employing the block bootstrap algorithm with 500 repli-
cations. *p<0.10, **p<0.05,***p<0.01; Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and
Statistical Offices of the Länder, [survey years 2003-2014], own calculations.
As shown by Bertrand et al. (2004), conventional standard errors in DD applications with
long time series and a high serial correlation in the outcome variable are inconsistent. There-
fore, I apply the block bootstrap procedure with 500 replications in order to obtain adequate
standard errors for the estimated treatment effects clustered at the firm-level. My results show
a significant negative effect of the EU ETS on firm-level cost efficiency of 15.3 percent during
the first compliance period. The estimated treatment effect for the second compliance period is
16.1 percent, and 15.7 percent for the third compliance period. Table 9 reports the treatment
effects estimated using the non-parametric DD approach with nearest-neighbor matching, de-
scribed in Section 3.3.2. When matching with the nearest neighbor, I obtain an average negative
treatment effect of 14 percent, for the first compliance period. When adding the five closest
neighbors to the control group, it increases the treatment effect to -15.4 percent. Adding the
twenty closest neighbours, further increases the negative treatment effect to -15.7 percent. Also
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Table 9: Non-parametric DD approach with matching: treatment effects for the full sample
Dependent Variable: Cost efficiency in logs
Full sample one neighbor five neighbors twenty neighbors
Phase1 -0.140*** -0.154*** -0.157***
Phase2 -0.143*** -0.166*** -0.171***
Phase3 -0.140*** -0.167*** -0.169***
Year FE yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes
Industry × Year FE yes yes yes
Additional Controls yes yes yes
# Observations 7042 11529 19444
Standard errors are computed by employing the block bootstrap algorithm with 500 replications.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05,***p<0.01; Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices
of the Länder, [survey years 2003-2014], own calculations.
for the second and third compliance period, the nearest neighbor matching shows significantly
negative estimates. As the industries within the manufacturing sector produce very different
goods, face different market conditions on input and output markets, the effect of the EU ETS
on the regulated firms potentially varies across industries. The average treatment effect over
all industries, shown in Tables 8 and 9 therefore does not provide the full picture of the impact
of the EU ETS. For this reason, I analyze the effect of the EU ETS for selected subsample
of 2-digit industries: coke and refined petroleum products (19), pharmaceutical products (21),
rubber and plastic products (22) and basic metals industry(24). The results of the subsample
Table 10: Parametric DD approach treatment effects for selected 2-digit industries
Dependent Variable: Cost efficiency in logs
ISIC Rev.4 19 21 22 24
Phase1 -0.086 -0.092 ** -0.109*** -0.272***
Phase2 -0.034 -0.126*** -0.201*** -0.311***
Phase3 -0.117 -0.320*** -0.171*** -0.277***
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Additional Controls yes yes yes yes
# Observations 487 2129 10242 7154
Standard errors are computed by employing the block bootstrap algorithm with 500 replications.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05,***p<0.01; Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices
of the Länder, [survey years 2003-2014], own calculations.
analysis in Table 10 confirm the heterogeneity of the treatment effect, however this empirical
strategy also reduces the sample size. Consequently, the precision of the estimates decreases
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in comparison to the analysis using the full sample. The biggest negative average treatment
effect is found for industry (24), ranging from -27.2 percent in the first compliance period, to
-31.1 percent in the second compliance period and -27.7 percent in the third compliance period.
For industry (19), the impact of the EU ETS is negative but insignificant. Table 11 shows the
Table 11: Non-parametric DD approach with matching: treatment effects for selected 2-digit
industries
Dependent Variable: Cost efficiency in logs
ISIC Rev.4 19 21 22 24
# Neighbors 1 5 20 1 5 20 1 5 20 1 5 20
Phase1 -0.073 -0.071 -0.089* -0.064 -0.067 -0.075 -0.110*** -0.119*** -0.113*** -0.271*** -0.274*** -0.271***
Phase2 -0.091 -0.050 -0.045 -0.190** -0.178*** -0.103 -0.205*** -0.218*** -0.204*** -0.316*** -0.322*** -0.310***
Phase3 -0.175** -0.118 -0.105 -0.334*** -0.322*** -0.256*** -0.205*** -0.178*** -0.182*** -0.284*** -0.289*** -0.277***
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Observations 220 269 359 102 229 419 151 340 732 914 1496 2492
Standard errors are computed by employing the block bootstrap algorithm with 500 replications. *p<0.10, **p<0.05,***p<0.01;
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, [survey years 2003-2014], own calculations.
results of non-parametric DD approach for a subsample of industries. The biggest differences
are observed in industries (19) and (21). For industry 19, the EU ETS now demonstrates a
significant negative average treatment effect of -17.5 percent in the third compliance period
using the nearest-neighbor, and a significant negative average treatment effect of -8.9 percent
in the first compliance period using the next twenty neighbors. For industry (21), the average
negative treatment effects are lower than in table 10. The difference in outcomes is expected
as, applying the matching algorithm, I avoid the functional assumptions of the parametric DD
model and I only compare the regulated firms with very similar unregulated firms. Furthermore,
I am only able to compare firms that remain in the sample during the considered time.
5.3.2 Cost efficiency measured against a meta stochastic cost frontier
As the industries within the manufacturing sector also differ in terms of regulation, the average
treatment effect for specific industries shown in Table 11, fails to account for potential operation
under heterogeneous frontiers and overstates the impact of the EU ETS. For this reason, I also
analyze the effect of the EU ETS on meta-cost efficiency of treated firms in logs for industris (19)
and (21). As expected, Table 12 indicates drastically different results. The average treatment
effect of the EU ETS on firms in industry (19) is now much smaller, positive, and statistically
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Table 12: Parametric DD approach treatment effects for selected 2-digit industries
Dependent Variable:
Meta cost efficiency in logs
ISIC Rev.4 19 21
Phase1 0.018 -0.001
Phase2 0.051 -0.018
Phase3 0.002 -0.129*
Year FE yes yes
Firm FE yes yes
Additional Controls yes yes
# Observations 487 2129
Standard errors are computed by employing the block bootstrap algorithm
with 500 replications. *p<0.10, **p<0.05,***p<0.01; Source: RDC of the
Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, [survey years
2003-2014], own calculations.
insignificant. The average treatment effect of the EU ETS on firms in industry (21) is also
smaller, remains negative, and is slightly statistically significant only in third compliance period
(-12.9 percent).
6 Concluding discussion
This paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of the relationship between firm economic
performance and the regulation by the EU ETS in the context of the German manufactur-
ing sector, using official firm-level production census data for the period 2003-2014. German
manufacturing sector is the biggest European CO2 emitter, and the share of gross domestic
product (GDP) accounted for by manufacturing is higher in Germany than in any other Euro-
pean country (52%), which renders it important to investigate in the context of environmental
policy impacts. For 14 two-digit industries of the German manufacturing sector I estimate a
SCF to recover firm-specific cost efficiencies as a measure of economic performance. My results
indicate that the potential to increase cost efficiency exists in all industries and that the cost-
efficiency estimates are heterogeneous. Little is known about the determinants of cost efficiency
in the German manufacturing sector, the drivers were selected based on relevance for research
and policies. The analysis of drivers confirms a positive relationship between exporting and
the cost efficiency for most of the industries. On the contrary, the regulation by the EU ETS,
investments into research and development, as well as active trading of emission permits are all
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associated with lower cost containment capabilities. The latter rejects my first hypothesis, as
the regulation by the EU ETS seems to be a significant driver of cost-inefficiency, even-though
I have accounted for higher energy prices for regulated firms in my cost frontier model. These
results do not allow me to draw a clear conclusion about the relationship between the EU ETS
and the cost efficiency, but they might suggest that the EU ETS regulates less cost-efficient
firms, or that the impact of the EU ETS materializes in more than just an energy price increase
for regulated firms. For instance, higher R&D investments for regulated firms could increase
regulated firms’ total costs, which would make them appear less cost-efficient. One way to test
this claim would be to model this R&D investment as an additional output in the cost frontier.
Furthermore, if significant investments into R&D were actually made by most of the regulated
firms, then the unexpectedly low carbon prices would make most of them very unprofitable in
the short run. Using my adjustment for energy prices directly in the cost frontier, I could test
whether significantly higher carbon prices would confirm my first hypothesis.
In order to make cost-efficiency comparisons between between treatment groups within in-
dustries, I employed SMF analysis. The results of the intra-industry comparison suggest a
confirmation of my second hypothesis as regulated and non-regulated firms operate under het-
erogeneous frontiers in industries (19) and (21). In both industries, treated firms are confirmed
to be less cost-efficient than the control firms. However the difference in cost-efficiency levels
is found to be decreasing over time.
Combining the DDmodel with parametric conditioning strategies and non-parametric nearest-
neighbor matching allows me to isolate the average treatment effect of the EU ETS on firm-
specific cost efficiencies. Results suggest that the EU ETS does not homogeneously affect
various industries of the German manufacturing sector, but that the effect was predominantly
negative and mostly highly statistically significant in all three compliance periods. However, as
the estimation of cost efficiency using homogeneous frontiers for regulated and non-regulated
firms is potentially problematic in light of the EU ETS regulation, I also investigate the aver-
age treatment effect of the EU ETS on firm-specific meta cost efficiencies. As expected, the
results are very different. The negative treatment effect is slightly significant for just one of
the two industries, and only in the third compliance period. For the other industry, there is no
significant effect of the EU ETS on treated firms. Although these results are preliminary, they
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do confirm that the use of SMF is critical when evaluating the impact of the EU ETS.
The fact that I find a significant negative effect of the EU ETS on firm-level cost-efficiency is
surprising. Previous literature, although not directly related to cost-efficiency, found very small
and mostly insignificant impacts of the EU ETS in terms of firms productivity. At this stage of
my research, I cannot fully clarify the mechanisms at work for a number of reasons. First, when
interpreting my results I assumed that EU ETS only influences treated firms. Due to spillover
and equilibrium intra-industry effects, the SUTVA is likely violated, which is one of the obvious
limitations to my study. In a future version of this paper, the importance of SUTVA violation
will be addressed via robustness checks. Second, German manufacturing firms are not subject
solely to the EU ETS regulation. In my study I neglect to consider other regulatory instruments,
such as energy taxes and electricity price surcharges, that might interact with the effect of the
EU ETS. Third, in its current form, my stochastic cost frontier model suffers from potential
endogeneity concerns. My measure of output is potentially endogenous, as it is a choice variable
for most firms. Energy input prices are potentially endogenous because of negotiations between
firms and energy suppliers, e.g. fixed-term contracts between electricity generators and firms or
long-term gas contracts. My measure of labour costs, affecting the input price for labour, could
also be endogenous because of unobserved input quality. In the existing stochastic frontier
analysis literature, the use of solutions such as the control function for the unobservables,
introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), is not straightforward,
due to non-linearities. For this reason, the issue of endogeneity in stochastic cost frontier
models has so far been somewhat ignored. Health economics and health services research, has
previously addressed these concerns using a two-stage residual inclusion approach.33 Recently,
Karakaplan and Kutlu (2015) and Karakaplan and Kutlu (2017) developed their own stochastic
frontier estimator, which has been proven to outperform standard stochastic frontier estimators,
as it can treat the endogeneity of both frontier and inefficiency variables. Their estimator is
easy to implement in Stata using their module. In a future version of the paper I will present
the results of using the latter approach, to address the endogeneity in my emprical application.
Finally, it is also possible that the observed negative effect is actually reflecting a short run
shock, as treated firms made considerable investments into research and development. Low
EUA prices have not made it possible to contain their costs better during my observed period,
33For more information, see Terza et al. (2008) and Garrido et al. (2012).
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but it would be interesting to check whether these strong effects are still present in recent years,
as the EUA prices have risen. Future work could tackle some of these issues.
Note: Parts of this is work are still in progress and as such subject to change. I kindly ask
the reader to refer to the most recent updates of our work by using the external link provided
at the beginning of the document.
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Appendix
A Additional Results
A.1 Inter-Industry Comparison
The results in Table A.1 confirm that the estimation of separate stochastic cost frontiers for
each industry in the period 2003-2014 is appropriate, as the cost efficiency, estimated using the
pooled cost frontier (CEpooled), consistently deviates from the cost efficiency estimated using
industry-specific cost frontiers (CEgroup). For industries (10), (13), (21), (22), (24) and (29),
estimation using the pooled cost frontier underestimates the actual cost efficiency, while the
opposite is true for the remaining industries. If one were to directly compare CEgroup scores
Table A.1: The comparison of mean cost efficiency scores using SCF and SMF analyses in years
2003, 2005 and 2010
Year 2003 2005 2010
ISIC Rev.4 CEpooled CEgroup CGR MCE CEpooled CEgroup CGR MCE CEpooled CEgroup CGR MCE
10 0,6291 0,7367 0,7328 0,5405 0,6323 0,7349 0,7387 0,5423 0,6223 0,7322 0,7305 0,5352
(0,1701) (0,0929) (0,1593) (0,1369) (0,1648) (0,0959) (0,1574) (0,1339) (0,1683) (0,0934) (0,1606) (0,1389)
13 0,6746 0,7509 0,7758 0,5828 0,6810 0,7527 0,7811 0,5884 0,6853 0,7535 0,7966 0,6008
(0,1205) (0,1033) (0,0647) (0,0926) (0,1292) (0,1136) (0,0647) (0,1005) (0,1231) (0,1065) (0,0632) (0,0974)
16 0,7041 0,6503 0,9228 0,5998 0,7068 0,6549 0,9222 0,6033 0,7010 0,6493 0,9190 0,5962
(0,1273) (0,1544) (0,0250) (0,1419) (0,1233) (0,1509) (0,0254) (0,1377) (0,1271) (0,1506) (0,0281) (0,1376)
19 0,6895 0,5834 0,9125 0,5598 0,6633 0,5540 0,9211 0,5309 0,6378 0,5349 0,9297 0,5126
(0,2743) (0,2751) (0,1683) (0,2835) (0,2597) (0,2588) (0,1515) (0,2665) (0,2616) (0,2767) (0,1358) (0,2774)
20 0,7004 0,6667 0,9363 0,6241 0,7103 0,6731 0,9423 0,6340 0,7139 0,6619 0,9522 0,6301
(0,1486) (0,1523) (0,0145) (0,1424) (0,1455) (0,1492) (0,0141) (0,1400) (0,1500) (0,1573) (0,0117) (0,1495)
21 0,6658 0,6675 0,8790 0,5870 0,6721 0,6790 0,8748 0,5941 0,6703 0,6859 0,8554 0,5879
(0,1597) (0,1703) (0,0528) (0,1568) (0,1541) (0,1571) (0,0543) (0,1447) (0,1404) (0,1403) (0,0563) (0,1307)
22 0,6904 0,7403 0,8454 0,6256 0,7037 0,7506 0,8519 0,6393 0,7126 0,7495 0,8678 0,6501
(0,1180) (0,1086) (0,0412) (0,0952) (0,1136) (0,1038) (0,0382) (0,0921) (0,1124 (0,1069) (0,0343) (0,0940)
24 0,7101 0,8053 0,8682 0,6970 0,7297 0,7969 0,8846 0,7021 0,7352 0,7896 0,9015 0,7096
(0,1256) (0,0864) (0,0505) (0,0680) (0,1219) (0,1071) (0,0451) (0,0836) (0,1234) (0,1142) (0,0378) (0,0948)
25 0,7353 0,7257 0,9204 0,6675 0,7299 0,7257 0,9133 0,6625 0,7131 0,7232 0,8889 0,6427
(0,1080) (0,1227) (0,0178) (0,1116) (0,1123) (0,1240) (0,0194) (0,1127) (0,1079) (0,1153) (0,0243) (0,1029)
26 0,7164 0,6574 0,9485 0,6236 0,7283 0,6700 0,9497 0,6362 0,7413 0,6797 0,9540 0,6485
(0,1322) (0,1511) (0,0110) (0,1437) (0,1296) (0,1490) (0,0124) (0,1418) (0,1282) (0,1481) (0,0084) (0,1415)
27 0,6829 0,6734 0,9061 0,6106 0,7076 0,6915 0,9175 0,6348 0,7392 0,6998 0,9422 0,6593
(0,1312) (0,1384) (0,0234) (0,1286) (0,1195) (0,1293) (0,0200) (0,1208) (0,1110) (0,1273) (0,0115) (0,1200)
28 0,7422 0,7305 0,9409 0,6874 0,7547 0,7520 0,9371 0,7048 0,7367 0,7413 0,9285 0,6883
(0,1066) (0,1282) (0,0114) (0,1218) (0,0998) (0,1183) (0,0121) (0,1121) (0,1047) (0,1221) (0,0149) (0,1144)
29 0,6938 0,7225 0,8871 0,6414 0,7067 0,7334 0,8897 0,6527 0,7111 0,7324 0,8990 0,6587
(0,1317) (0,1250) (0,0271) (0,1143) (0,1307) (0,1245) (0,0260) (0,1135) (0,1343) (0,1290) (0,0233) (0,1180)
30 0,6863 0,5967 0,9327 0,5558 0,6837 0,6011 0,9310 0,5606 0,6986 0,5924 0,9451 0,5590
(0,1654) (0,1996) (0,0384) (0,1851) (0,1721) (0,2070) (0,0543) (0,1930) (0,1400) (0,1849) (0,0304) (0,1736)
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, [survey years 2003-2014], own calculations.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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between different industries, one could conclude that industry (24) is the most cost efficient
industry of the German manufacturing sector, and that industry (19) is the least cost-efficient
one in years 2003, 2005 and 2010. But such a direct comparison is not valid, as these cost
efficiency scores were estimated using different stochastic cost frontiers. As Table A.1 shows,
the estimation using SMF paints a different picture. The only valid direct comparison is the
one of meta cost efficiency scores (MCE), which ranks industry (24) as the most cost-efficient
industry in year 2003 and 2010, whereas the first place is overtaken by industry (28) in 2005.
The differences in ranking of firms over time, using SCF and SMF, are reported in Table A.2.
The development of mean meta cost-efficiency scores over time is depicted in Figure 6 in the
Appendix.
Table A.2: The comparison of rankings using SCF and MCF analyses across years
2003 2005 2010
Ranking SCF MCF SCF MCF SCF MCF
1. 24 24 24 28 24 24
2. 13 28 13 24 13 28
3. 22 25 28 25 22 27
4. 10 29 22 29 28 29
5. 28 22 10 22 29 22
6. 25 20 29 26 10 26
7. 29 26 25 27 25 25
8. 27 27 27 20 27 20
9. 21 16 21 16 21 13
10. 20 21 20 21 26 16
11. 26 13 26 13 20 21
12. 16 19 16 30 16 30
13. 30 30 30 10 30 10
14. 19 10 19 19 19 19
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of
the Länder, [survey years 2003-2014], own calculations.
B Additional Figures
32
(a) Coke and refined petroleum products (b) Pharmaceutical products
(c) Rubber and plastic products (d) Basic metals
Figure A.1: Mean cost efficiency scores across the years for selected 2-digit industries (19), (21),
(22), (24). Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder,
[survey years 2003-2014], own calculations.
C Further data description
2-digit industry level classification:
In the period 2003-2008, the industry classification in my dataset ("Wirtschaftszweig") is based
on NACE Revision 1.1. After 2008, the classification has changed in accordance with the
European implementation NACE Revision 2 (Statistical Classification of Economic Activities
in the European Community) of the UN classification ISIC Revision 4. I reclassified the years
before 2008 using official reclassification guide of the statistical offices at the four-digit industry
code level, to be able to use the ISIC Rev.4 classification throughout. In the interest of having
enough observations, I carry out the final analysis on the two-digit industry level.
Merging of AFiD, EUTL and Orbis:
I combine different modules of AFiD data set via plant and firm-level identifiers. Matching
AFiD data with EUTL and Orbis, however, requires a three-step procedure. Firstly, EUTL
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(a) Coke and refined petroleum products (b) Pharmaceutical products
(c) Rubber and plastic products (d) Basic metals
Figure A.2: Regulated firms and unregulated firms mean cost efficiency scores across the years
for selected 2-digit industries (19), (21), (22), (24). Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical
Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, [survey years 2003-2014], own calculations.
and Orbis information are combined in a single dataset. Then, this external dataset of firms is
combined with the German Business Register using information on commercial register number,
VAT number, address and emissions in order to obtain a unique company identification number.
Using the latter, external dataset can be combined with the AFiD dataset. I am able to match
83 percent (1117 firms) of the firms in the EUTL with the commercial register number. My
matching is 6 percent better than in previous attempts by authors using the same data. The
firms that are not matched mainly belong to non-manufacturing sectors.
D Perpetual Inventory Method for Capital Stock Estima-
tion
As is standard whenever data does not provide explicit capital stock information, I use perpetual
inventory method to compute capital stocks at the firm-level. In what follows we borrow from
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Figure A.3: Inter-industry comparison of yearly mean meta-cost efficiency scores. Source: RDC
of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, [survey years 2003-2014],
own calculations.
(a) Coke and refined petroleum products (b) Pharmaceutical products
Figure A.4: Intra-industry comparison of yearly mean meta cost efficiency scores across treat-
ment groups for selected 2-digit industries (19), (21). Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical
Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, [survey years 2003-2014], own calculations.
Lutz (2016).
Perpetual inventory method relies on the following fundamental formula:
Kt = Kt−1(1− δ) + It, (A.1)
where K denotes capital stock, δ the geometric depreciation rate and I the investment. I derive
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the initial capital stock K1 from the equation (A.1):
K1 = I0 + I−1(1− δ) + I−2(1− δ)2 + . . . (A.2)
K1 =
∞∑
s=0
Is(1− δ)s (A.3)
I assume the real investments grow at rate g:
K1 = I0
∞∑
s=0
[
(1− δ)
(1 + g)
]s
(A.4)
K1 = I0
(1 + g)
(g + δ)
(A.5)
I can therefore define the capital stock in the first period as:
K1 = I1
1
(g + δ)
(A.6)
Lutz (2016) points out that in the "AFiD Panel Manufacturing Plants" investments fluctuate
greatly over time and this complicates the computation of inital capital stocks. To overcome
this, I need to compute the average It over all periods available and estimate I1:
Î1 =
∑n
t=0
It+1
(1+i)t
n
(A.7)
D.1 Data preparation
For information on investment in machinery and equipment, investment in buildings, and in-
vestment in properties without buildings. I use firm-level investment data from the AFiD-Panel
Industriebetriebe ("AFiD Panel Manufacturing Plants"). I deflate investments using industry-
specific deflators for machinery and equipment as well as general deflators for buildings and
property without buildings. I start from K1 and plug in firm-specific investments and the in-
dustry specific time-varying depreciation rates into equation (A.1) to compute the entire time
series of the firm’s capital stock. As I observe annual firm-level investment data for the period
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2003-2014, the growth rate of capital g and the depreciation rate δ can either be assumed to
take a certain value or estimated using aggregated data, e.g. industry-level data. We compute
industry-specific average growth and depreciation rates using aggregate data from the Destatis
portal GENESIS. I use the same source for the deflators information.34 In particular we use
the statistics with the following codes: 81000-0107 National Accounts Depreciation, 81000-
0115 Gross Investment, 81000-0116 Gross Capital Stock, 81000-0117 Net Capital Stock, and
61262-0001 Price Index Property.
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